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optimism bias, i.e. expecting the future to hold more desirable than undesirable outcomes, also 
extends to people that we like or admire. However, it remains unknown how the brain generates 
this social optimism bias. in this study, respondents estimated the likelihood of future desirable and 
undesirable outcomes for an in-group and three out-groups: warm-incompetent, cold-competent, 
and cold-incompetent. We found a strong social optimism bias for the in-group and the warm out-
group and an inverted pattern for the cold-incompetent out-group. for all groups, scores of social 
optimism bias correlated with the brain activity in structures that respondents differentially engaged 
depending on the target social group. in line with our hypotheses, evaluating the in-group recruited the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, whereas evaluating the 
warm out-group engaged the posterior insula, mid cingulate cortex, and somatosensory cortices. these 
findings suggest different underlying cognitive mechanisms of social optimism bias for these groups, 
despite similar behavioural patterns. thinking about the cold out-groups recruited the right anterior 
temporal lobe, and temporoparietal junction. evaluating the cold-incompetent out-group additionally 
recruited the anterior insula, inferior frontal cortex and dorsomedial frontal cortex. We discuss these 
neuroimaging findings with respect to their putative cognitive functions.
Human minds are highly capable of solving problems at hand, anticipating prospective issues and benefits, and 
planning accordingly. At the core of these skills lies the capacity to gauge the likelihood of future events1–3. The 
way we assess the likelihood of future events in the general population is different from how we assess it for 
ourselves4–6, for those close to us7–10, and for in-group11,12 and out-group members11–19. Through various motiva-
tional20,21 and cognitive mechanisms22,23, we manifest an optimism bias whenever we think about our future and 
the future of those close to us4,8,10,11,13 but not of acquaintances or dissimilar others8,11,14,24,25. Specifically, we expect 
that the future holds significantly more desirable than undesirable outcomes for ourselves and those we identify 
with26. Despite a modest body of behavioural research on social optimism bias, i.e. optimism manifested towards 
people that we like and feel close to, very little is known about how the brain gives rise to this phenomenon18. The 
primary focus of the current study was to investigate the neural correlates of group membership-driven optimism 
biases. To pursue this research aim and inform our hypotheses, we considered the neuroimaging literature on 
person perception and social cognition.
A hallmark of social cognition is that individuals think differently about in-group and out-group mem-
bers27–32. Although what determines in-group and out-group membership is flexible and highly contextual30,33, 
people perceive in-group and out-group members as part of different entities with respect to one or more attrib-
utes32. Unsurprisingly, deliberating over in-group members is associated with a brain network that is involved in 
self-referential processing32,34–40: the ventromedial prefrontal cortex extending into the anterior cingulate cortex 
(vmPFC/ACC) and the precuneus extending into the posterior cingulate cortex (PCUN/PCC). Deliberating over 
out-groups typically engages brain structures associated with accessing conceptual knowledge and stereotypical 
thinking41–44: the temporoparietal junction45–48 (TPJ), the anterior temporal lobes49–51 (ATL), the dorsomedial 
frontal cortex52,53 (dmFC) and potentially the inferior frontal cortex54 (IFC).
A formal theoretical model of social cognition is the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), which states that we 
think and feel about others in terms of two orthogonal dimensions, perceived warmth, i.e. how (un)likeable some-
one is, and perceived competence, i.e. how (un)respectable someone is55–62. The SCM predicts that the warmth 
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dimension weighs more in impression formation than the competence dimension56,60,63. According to the SCM, 
out-groups can be placed on a continuum by virtue of their combined warmth and competence dimensions60,64–66. 
For example, there can be “mild”, warm but not competent out-groups (e.g. the elderly and individuals with disa-
bilities67,68), “moderate”, cold but competent out-groups (e.g. successful business people58,64,69) and “extreme”, cold 
and not competent out-groups (e.g. drug and substance abusers60). Typical social emotions associated with each 
type of out-group encapsulate pity and sympathy for the warm-incompetent out-group, envy and jealousy for the 
cold-competent out-group and contempt and disgust for the cold-incompetent out-group58,62.
The tenet of the SCM is that there are more out-groups that trigger ambivalent emotions and prejudice than 
clear-cut disparaging or threatening reactions58,70. It is important to note that SCM does not contradict previous 
research on the role of threat induced by out-groups; rather, it opens the concept of out-group to incorporate 
other non-traditional forms56. Because of the combination of the warmth and competence dimensions into four 
groups of traits, some groups share one or the other dimension. A few neuroimaging studies of SCM have sug-
gested that highly-praised in-groups, and mild and moderate out-groups engage similar neural structures by 
virtue of their shared traits of either high warmth or high competence, respectively71,72. For example, the vmPFC 
was equally recruited when evaluating the warm and competent in-group, as well as two out-groups with which 
it shared one of the SCM dimensions: a warm but not competent out-group, and a cold but competent out-group. 
The authors suggested that this is indicative of similar cognitive mechanisms of evaluation on account of the 
shared dimensions71. By contrast, evaluating an extreme out-group (cold and not competent) was associated 
with insular and amygdala activity in a pattern characteristic of dehumanized perception71. These findings are 
somewhat in contrast with the wider literature on social neuroscience which has found qualitative differences in 
the perception of in-groups and out-groups, with the latter invariably engaging regions of stereotypical thinking 
(e.g.32,37,38,73). A secondary goal of the present study was, therefore, to properly address the apparent disagreement 
between the SCM predictions and the social neuroscience findings, at large.
Our current study adapted the paradigm developed by Dricu et al.74 for functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI). In short, participants rated the likelihood of a set of identical desirable and undesirable target events 
occurring to four different fictional characters. These characters mapped onto each of the four quadrants of the 
SCM: a warm and competent in-group, a warm and not competent out-group, a cold and competent out-group, 
and a cold and not competent out-group. An earlier behavioural study based on this paradigm showed that 
respondents manifested a prominent desirability bias towards the in-group and the warm out-group, i.e. more 
desirable events were forecasted than undesirable events74. Respondents did not manifest a desirability bias 
towards the cold and competent out-group (i.e. desirable and undesirable events would occur equally often) 
but they expected significantly more undesirable than desirable events to happen for the “extreme” cold and not 
competent out-group. In other words, the direction of the desirability bias was inversed for the latter group. These 
findings, along with the evidence from the neuroimaging literature on social groups, have informed our following 
hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Our main guiding hypothesis was that the phenomenon of desirability bias is generated in the brain structures 
that the respondents differentially engage depending on a target’s group membership. Based on the wider social 
cognition literature, we postulated that the biases towards different social groups are driven by different cogni-
tive processes. Specifically, we hypothesized that the desirability bias manifested for the in-group member can 
be traced to regions of self-referential processing, as informed by the general social cognition literature (H1), 
e.g. vmPFC/ACC and PCUN/PCC34–40,75. We note that the SCM predicts that similar cognitive processes are 
recruited whenever we evaluate social groups that share a dimension60. This would transcend group membership, 
i.e. in-group vs. out-group, and the shared SCM dimension would be enough to generate these similarities. Yet, 
only a single neuroimaging study has found evidence for this SCM prediction71, and this finding has not been rep-
licated72. In line with the extant neuroimaging literature on social groups, therefore, we postulated that responses 
to the in-group generally differ from the ones to different kinds of out-groups.
Moreover, regarding out-group members, we predicted that not all out-groups are perceived homoge-
nously64,67,76. For example, the associated emotions and behavioural tendencies of the mild (warm and not com-
petent) out-group are conducive to empathy (even more so than the in-group66,77), whereas the emotions and 
behavioural tendencies of the moderate and extreme (i.e., cold) out-groups are not66,77–82. In fact, if given the 
chance, people are more likely to attack moderate out-group members (active harm66, e.g. apply painful but not 
deadly electric shocks) and sacrifice extreme out-group members (passive harm83, e.g. respondents only have to 
let events follow their natural course in a Trolley moral dilemma) than mild out-group members. These findings 
strongly suggest that the warm out-group is unique among all out-groups66,67,70,84. We thus expected that the 
desirability bias would manifest for a warm (and not competent) out-group target and could be traced to regions 
associated with compassion and empathic concern (H2), such as the posterior insula85–87, the somatosensory 
cortices85–91, the cingulate cortex87,89, and potentially the motor cortices92,93. The desirability bias for the cold 
out-groups, on the other hand, would be associated with the brain activity in a network of regions associated with 
stereotypical thinking (H3), e.g. the TPJ45–48, ATL49–51, dmFC52,53, and, possibly, the IFC54.
Finally, we generated a hypothesis about the unique pattern of the desirability bias for the “extreme” out-group 
members, i.e. cold and not competent. Previously, participants expected members of this out-group to expe-
rience significantly more undesirable than desirable events74. That is, the desirability bias manifested towards 
this out-group was inversed compared to the other social groups. Past research has found that members of such 
extreme out-groups are often dehumanized94, on account of the SCM predicting that extreme out-group members 
trigger emotions of contempt and disgust62. Therefore, we predicted that the desirability bias for the alcoholic 
character can be traced to the anterior insula71,72, the amygdala71,72 and, possibly, the dmFC95,96 (H4), regions 
associated with feelings of disgust and repulsion.
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Results
Behavioural results. Likelihood estimates. We computed four one-sample t-tests (one for each character) 
on the differences in z-standardized likelihood estimates for desirable events and undesirable events. Participants 
expressed a desirability bias for all four fictional characters, i.e. desirable events were rated significantly different 
from undesirable events (all Ps < 0.0005, corrected for multiple testing).
A 2 (high/low warmth) × 2 (high/low competence) repeated measures ANOVA was computed on the dif-
ferences in z-standardized likelihood estimates for desirable and undesirable events to investigate any differ-
ences between characters on the magnitude and direction of desirability bias. We found main effects of warmth 
(F (1, 44) = 78.84, p < 0.0005, ηp2 = 0.627) and competence (F (1, 44) = 10.88, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.188), with the 
latter being qualified by an interaction effect (F (1, 44) = 29.72, p < 0.0005, ηp2 = 0.387). In effect, participants 
expressed a significantly higher desirability bias for warm characters than for cold characters (Diff = 13.94%, 
SD = 11.36%). Follow-up tests revealed that the in-group (M = 12.61%, MSE = 1.15%, SD = 7.48%) and the warm 
out-group (M = 13.68%, MSE = 1.63%, SD = 10.92%) generated similar magnitude levels of the desirability bias 
(t (44) = −0.560, p = 0.578, Cohen’s d = −0.08). Within cold characters, however, the direction of the desirabil-
ity bias was dependent on the target’s level of competence: the extreme out-group was expected to experience 
significantly more undesirable events than desirable ones, whereas it was the reverse for the moderate out-group 
(Fig. 1). Regarding the magnitude of the bias, the less competent cold out-group members elicited a signifi-
cantly higher bias (M = -7.58%, MSE = 2.58%, SD = 17.33%) than did the competent cold out-group (M = 5.53%, 
MSE = 2.58%, SD = 9.09%; t (44) = 5.020, p < 0.0005, Cohen’s d = 0.76).
Reaction times. To determine whether there are any differences in reaction times, we computed a warmth (cold 
vs. warm) × competence (high vs. low) repeated measures analysis of variance on deliberation times, i.e. the last 
release of the button press minus the first press of the button, separately for desirable and undesirable events. 
For desirable events, we found a marginally significant main effect of competence (F (1, 44) = 4.32, p = 0.044, 
ηp2 = 0.089) but no main effect of warmth (F (1, 44) = 1.77, p = 0.284, ηp2 = 0.026) or an interaction effect 
between warmth and competence (F (1, 44) = 0.072, p = 0.407, ηp2 = 0.016). Competent characters were rated 
faster (M = 2690.26 ms, MSE = 136.78 ms) than incompetent characters (M = 2825.49 ms, MSE = 124.29 ms). For 
undesirable events, there were no main effect of warmth (F (1, 44) = 0.02, p = 0.888, ηp2 < 0.001), of competence 
(F (1, 44) = 1.80, p = 0.186, ηp2 = 0.039) or an interaction between warmth and competence (F (1, 44) = 0.369, 
p = 0.546, ηp2 = 0.008).
functional imagining data. Hypothesis H1: desirability bias for the in-group. To compare responses to the 
in-group with the responses to the three different out-groups, the following three contrasts were computed at the 
first level and subsequently taken to the second level where a conjunction analysis was performed: in-group vs. 
mild out-group, in-group vs. moderate out-group and in-group vs. extreme out-group. The conjunction analysis 
revealed significant activation in the PCUN extending into the PCC and in the vmPFC (Fig. 2, Table 1).
To directly test our hypothesis H1 (desirability bias manifested toward the in-group member is associated with 
regions of self-referential processing), we correlated the desirability bias for the in-group member (compared to 
out-group members) with the mean parameter estimates of the clusters identified in the PCUN/PCC and vmPFC 
from the three-way conjunction analysis. In line with H1 we found a significant correlation (Benjamini-Hochberg 
corrected for two tests) between the desirability bias for the in-group and brain activation in the vmPFC (r = 0.39, 
95% CI [0.19, 0.64]; Spearman rho = 0.34, p = 0.021). The correlation with the parameter estimates in the PCUN/
PCC did not reach statistical significance (r = 0.27, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.50]; Spearman rho = 0.30, p = 0.045, 
Benjamini-Hochberg corrected for two tests; Supplementary Fig. S1).
Hypothesis H2: desirability bias for warm out-group. A similar approach was taken to investigate the character-
istics of the three out-groups, i.e. hypotheses H2, H3, and H4. The following three contrasts were computed at 
Figure 1. Desirability bias scores for the four social groups, calculated as the difference between the likelihood 
estimates for desirable events and undesirable events. The student character served as the warm-competent 
in-group member, the elderly as the mild (warm-incompetent) out-group, the businessperson as the moderate 
(cold-competent) out-group, and the alcoholic as the extreme (cold-incompetent) out-group.
4Scientific RepoRtS |         (2020) 10:1139  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-58121-4
www.nature.com/scientificreportswww.nature.com/scientificreports/
the first level and then taken to the second level: mild out-group vs. in-group, moderate out-group vs in-group 
and extreme out-group vs. in-group. Subsequently, a one-way flexible factorial model (factor: minuend char-
acter) with three levels (mild out-group, moderate out-group, extreme out-group) was computed on the three 
second-level contrasts. We used the outcome of this single SPM matrix to investigate the characteristics of the 
out-groups and address the three hypotheses. To determine which brain regions, if any, were similarly activated 
by the warm out-group and the two cold out-groups with respect to the in-group, we performed a three-way 
conjunction analysis on these second-level images. This analysis did not reveal any significant overlap in brain 
activation with respect to the in-group.
In preparation for testing hypothesis H2, i.e. desirability bias for the warm out-group being associated with 
regions of empathic concern, we used the previously described factorial model to perform a pairwise comparison 
between the warm out-group and the cold out-groups. This allowed to determine whether any brain regions are 
uniquely recruited by the warm out-group compared to the cold out-groups. Extensive activation was found 
in regions associated with empathy and compassion for others, i.e. bilateral posterior insula, the cingulate cor-
tex, and secondary and primary somatosensory cortices (Fig. 3, Supplementary Table S1). We then performed 
brain-behaviour correlations between the desirability bias for the warm out-group and the contrast estimates 
found in our seven hypothesized regions, i.e. the cingulate cortex, bilateral insula, and bilateral primary and 
secondary somatosensory cortices. Significant correlations (Benjamini-Hochberg corrected for seven tests) were 
found between the desirability bias for the warm out-group (compared to the in-group and cold out-groups) and 
the brain activity in the left supramarginal gyrus/secondary somatosensory cortex (r = −0.42, 95% CI [−0.64, 
−0.13]; Spearman rho = −0.45, p = 0.002). No significant brain-behaviour correlations were found for the 
remaining six regions (left posterior insula (r = −0.27, 95% CI [−0.53, 0.05]; Spearman rho = −0.19, p = 0.217), 
right posterior insula (r = 0.15, 95% CI [−0.14, 0.41]; Spearman rho = 0.15, p = 0.340), mid cingulate cortex 
(r = −0.14, 95% CI [−0.40, 0.15]; Spearman rho = −0.14, p = 0.378), left primary somatosensory (r = −0.17, 
95% CI [−0.46, 0.16]; Spearman rho = −0.20, p = 0.196), right primary somatosensory cortex (r = −0.21, 95% 
Figure 2. Three-way conjunction analysis of the contrasts in-group vs. mild out-group, in-group vs. moderate 
out-group, and in-group vs. extreme out-group. The left-side image depicts brain activation in precuneus 
extending into the posterior cingulate cortex (Pre/PCC) and in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). 
The right-side top image shows the contrast estimates separately for each social group in the left vmPFC. The 
right-side bottom image shows the brain-behaviour correlation between contrast estimates in the left vmPFC 
and the desirability bias scores for the in-group. p < 0.001 at voxel-level and p < 0.01 at cluster-level.
Region Cluster size z-score
MNI 
coordinates
Precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex 81 4.34 −4, −58, 16
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 76 3.94 −8, 52, −8
^ 3.71 −6, 40, −12
Table 1. Regions that are significantly more active when evaluating the in-group member vs. the out-group 
members, as shown by the three-way conjunction analysis of the contrasts in-group vs. mild out-group, in-
group vs. moderate out-group, and in-group vs. extreme out-group. p < 0.001 and a cluster-level p < 0.01. ^part 
of the same functional cluster.
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CI [−0.51, 0.13]; Spearman rho = −0.19, p = 0.211) and right supramarginal/secondary somatosensory cortex 
(r = −0.17, 95% CI [−0.43, 0.13]; Spearman rho = −0.22, p = 0.152, Supplementary Fig. S1).
Hypothesis H3: desirability bias for cold out-groups. To prepare for testing hypothesis H3, i.e. desirability bias 
for the cold out-group members is associated with the BOLD signal in regions of stereotypical thinking, we per-
formed two analyses. First, a two-way conjunction analysis on the two second-level contrast images moderate 
outgroup vs. in-group and extreme out-group vs. in-group revealed a significant overlap in brain activation in the 
IFC, the ATL and the TPJ (Fig. 4, Table 2). Second, a [−2 1 1] contrast was calculated in the above (see analyses 
related to H2) specified one-way flexible factorial analysis to determine whether any brain regions are uniquely 
recruited by the cold out-groups compared to the warm out-group (and the in-group). Calculation of this con-
trast revealed extensive activation in regions such as anterior temporal pole, dmFC, and superior temporal sulcus 
(Supplementary Table S2).
To directly address hypothesis H3, we correlated the desirability biases for our two cold out-groups, on one 
hand, and the parameter estimates found in the four hypothesized regions, i.e. the ATL, the TPJ, and the pars 
triangularis and pars orbitalis of the IFC. Two significant correlations (Benjamini-Hochberg corrected for eight 
tests) were found between the desirability bias for moderate out-group (compared to in-group) and the brain 
activity in the ATL (r = −0.39, 95% CI [−0.65, −0.097]; Spearman rho = −0.37, p = 0.012) and the pars orbit-
alis of the IFC (r = −0.34, 95% CI [−0.62, −0.04]; Spearman rho = −0.39, p = 0.009). Parameter estimates for 
the TPJ (r = −0.19, 95% CI [−0.49, 0.02]; Spearman rho = −0.26, p = 0.082) and the pars triangularis of the 
IFC (r = −0.26, 95% CI [−0.53, 0.03]; Spearman rho = −0.24, p = 0.120) did not reach statistical difference 
(Benjamini-Hochberg corrected for eight tests; Supplementary Fig. S2). Furthermore, a significant correlation 
(Benjamini-Hochberg corrected for eight tests) was found between the desirability bias for the extreme out-group 
(compared to in-group) and the brain activity in the ATL (r = −0.38, 95% CI [−0.61, −0.06]; Spearman 
rho = −0.38, p = 0.011) but not in the TPJ (r = −0.16, 95% CI [−0.43, 0.19]; Spearman rho = −0.16, p = 0.294), 
the pars triangularis (r = −0.22, 95% CI [−0.50, 0.09]; Spearman rho = −0.22, p = 0.149) or the pars orbitalis of 
the IFC (r = −0.21, 95% [−0.48, 0.11]; Spearman rho = 0.21, p = 0.173; Supplementary Fig. S2).
Hypothesis H4: desirability bias for the extreme out-group. Lastly, to determine whether the desirability bias 
manifested towards the extreme out-group correlates with regions of dehumanized perception (H4), we first used 
the previous one-way flexible factorial model to contrast the cold, extreme out-group against the cold, moderate 
out-group and the warm out-group (all against the in-group as baseline). In line with our hypothesis, this analysis 
revealed activation in the left pars orbitalis of the IFC extending into the anterior insula, bilateral dmFC, the right 
ATL and two clusters in the right pars triangularis of the IFC (Fig. 5, Table 3). A statistically significant correlation 
Figure 3. Top two images depict right-side (R) and left-side (L) brain activation from the flexible factorial 
contrast 2 × (mild out-group − in-group) − [(moderate out-group − in-group) + (extreme out-group − in-
group)]. For the labelling of these regions, please consult Supplementary Table S1. The bottom two images show 
parameter estimates for the four social groups in the left supramarginal gyrus (bottom left-side) and brain-
behavioural correlation between the respective desirability bias for the mild out-group and contrast estimates in 
the left supramarginal gyrus (bottom right-side). p < 0.001 at voxel-level and p < 0.01 at cluster-level.
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(Benjamini-Hochberg corrected for six tests) was found between the desirability bias for extreme out-group 
(compared to the other social groups) and the brain activity in the right pars triangularis of IFC (r = 0.43, 95% CI 
[0.13, 0.67]; Spearman rho = 0.45, p = 0.002). No significant correlations (Benjamini-Hochberg corrected for six 
tests) were found for the left pars orbitalis (r = −0.19, 95% CI [−0.44, 0.12], Spearman rho = −0.09, p = 0.557), 
the right dmFC (r = −0.09, 95% CI [−0.39, 0.21], Spearman rho = −0.04, p = 0.809), the left dmFC (r = 0.05, 
95% CI [−0.23, 0.32], Spearman rho = 0.12, p = 0.434), the ATL (r = 0.04, 95% CI [−0.27, 0.33], Spearman 
rho = 0.02, p = 0.910) or the second cluster in pars triangularis (r = 0.21, 95% CI [−0.07, 0.47], Spearman 
rho = 0.21, p = 0.165; Supplementary Fig. S3).
For the interested reader, we also computed the same analyses described above separately for desirable 
and undesirable events (Supplementary Tables S3 and S4), as well as a 2 × 4 (valence × character) ANOVA 
(Supplementary Table S5). Supplementary Fig. S4 provides parameter estimates for some of the regions found 
significant in the main effect of character and the interaction effect of character and valence. These analyses 
provide further details on the social cognition about the in-group versus out-groups in desirable and undesirable 
situations.
Discussion
Our study aimed to investigate the neural correlates of social optimism bias depending on a target’s social group 
membership. These neural signatures can inform about the cognitive mechanisms underlying different forms 
of social optimism bias. The literature has shown that people evaluate in-group and out-group members funda-
mentally different27. Through various motivational and cognitive mechanisms, we perceive the in-group more 
favourably than the out-group27,30,97,98. For example, maintaining a high self-esteem is a strong motivational 
factor to praise in-group members28,29, while the lack of first-hand knowledge about certain categories of peo-
ple means that stereotypes will be used to infer conclusions about them41,99. This also manifests in the way we 
think about the future: we anticipate that desirable events will happen significantly more often than undesirable 
events for people that we like, whereas the opposite pattern is expected for those we dislike74. In line with the 
SCM, and fully replicating our behavioural data in a previous study74, we show that participants manifested a 
strong desirability bias, i.e. expected more desirable than undesirable events for the in-group and the warm (but 
not competent) out-group members. A desirability bias was also present for the cold and competent out-group, 
likely due to its perceived levels of skill and expertise, but its magnitude was significantly lower than for the 
in-group and warm out-group (and it had not been significant in our earlier study). Together, these findings 
support the SCM prediction that the warmth dimension has a stronger impact on impression formation about 
Figure 4. The top left image depicts brain activation from the two-way conjunction analysis between the 
contrasts [moderate out-group – in-group] and [extreme out-group – in-group]. For the labelling of these 
regions, please consult Supplementary Table 2. Top right image shows contrast estimates for the four social 
groups in the right anterior temporal lobe (ATL). The bottom two images show correlation analyses between 
contrast estimates in the right ATL and desirability bias scores for the extreme out-group (compared to in-
group; bottom left side) and the moderate out-group (compared to in-group; bottom right-side), respectively. 
p < 0.001 at voxel-level and p < 0.01 at cluster-level.
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out-groups (thereby making the bias for the warm out-group similar to the one for the in-group than the compe-
tence dimension). Lastly, participants expected significantly more undesirable than desirable events to happen to 
the cold-incompetent out-group.
Behaviourally, our respondents manifested the same magnitude and direction of the optimism bias for the 
in-group and the warm out-group. Our neuroimaging findings strongly suggest that this similarity is likely an 
epiphenomenon rather than the outcome of similar cognitive mechanisms generated by the shared warmth 
dimension. Instead, the two biases are likely regulated by different cognitive mechanisms. Evaluating in-group 
members increased neural activity in the vmPFC and the PCUN extending into the PCC, both regions supporting 
self-referential processing34–40,75. Self-referential processing refers to the class of cognitive processes in which the 
individual distinguishes stimuli related to one’s own self from those that are not relevant to one’s own concerns75. 
This includes evaluating oneself on personality traits and accessing autobiographical memories. Although lesion 
studies and non-invasive brain stimulation would provide stronger support for the causal role of the vmPFC 
and PCUN/PCC in self-referential processing, medial brain structures are difficult to study with these methods. 
Figure 5. Top two images depict brain activation from the flexible factorial contrast 2 × (extreme out-group 
− in-group) − [(moderate out-group − in-group) + (mild out-group − in-group)]. For labelling of the regions, 
please consult Supplementary Table 3. Bottom left-side image illustrates contrast estimates for the four social 
groups. Bottom right-side image illustrates brain-behaviour correlation analysis between contrast estimates 
in the right pars triangularis and the desirability bias scores for the extreme out-group (compared to the other 
groups). p < 0.001 at voxel-level and p < 0.01 at cluster-level.
Region
Cluster 
size z-score
MNI 
coordinates
Pars triangularis (inferior frontal cortex) 126 4.88 58, 20, 6
^ 3.80 56, 32, 8
Anterior temporal lobe 101 4.43 48, 16, −38
Pars orbitalis (inferior frontal cortex) 85 4.32 38, 24, −16
Temporoparietal junction 121 3.87 44, −56, 22
^ 3.75 52, −54, 24
^ 3.49 64, −50, 20
Table 2. Regions that are significantly more active when evaluating the cold out-groups vs. the in-group, as 
shown by the two-way conjunction analysis of the contrasts moderate (cold-competent) out-group vs. in-group 
and extreme (cold-incompetent) out-group vs. in-group. p < 0.001 and a cluster-level p < 0.01. ^part of the 
same functional cluster as above.
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Neurosynth is a viable alternative to these methods and offers a formal measure of the degree of confidence in the 
reverse inference, by estimating posterior probabilities, i.e. the degree to which a region of interest is selectively 
activated by the cognitive process of interest100,101. A formal search for our peak coordinates in the PCUN/PCC 
and vmPFC on the Neurosynth platform (www.neurosynth.org) revealed that the top three highest posterior 
probabilities for the PCUN/PCC were 89% that it indexes “autobiographical memory”, followed by a probability 
of 79% that it indexes “episodic memory”, and 77% “self-referential processing”. The top three highest poste-
rior probabilities for our peak coordinate in the vmPFC were 85% for “autobiographical memory”, followed by 
83% for “remembering” and 82% for default-network. Together, these considerations yield strong support to 
our interpretation that the network of vmPFC and PCUN/PCC might indeed reflect self-referential processes. 
Of these regions, the brain activity in the vmPFC significantly correlated with the behavioural scores for desir-
ability bias manifested towards the in-group characters. In light of this finding, it is likely that respondents rec-
ognize the in-group members as relevant to oneself and evaluate them on the basis of their personal experiences 
which are then extrapolated (e.g. self-anchoring102) and/or based on direct interaction with in-group members 
(i.e. first-hand knowledge of their idiosyncratic behaviour). In turn, the strong desirability bias manifested for 
the in-group might stem from a similar self-serving bias40 that underlies personal optimism103. In other words, 
respondents may be driven by a motivation to reach and maintain positive self-esteem via in-group favouritism104.
Although similar in its behavioural pattern to the in-group, the desirability bias manifested towards the warm 
out-group might come from a different mechanism, namely an empathic concern for their well-being82,105. Largely 
consistent with our a priori hypothesis, when participants evaluated the warm (and incompetent) out-group, they 
engaged a network of brain regions consisting of bilateral insula, the mid cingulate cortex, and bilateral primary 
and secondary somatosensory cortices. We argue that the significance of this network may indeed relate to an 
empathic response of respondents towards the warm out-group. In support for such an interpretation of the data, 
the same regions have been implicated in two separate neuroimaging meta-analyses in the empathy for others 
in pain based either on facial expression alone106 or inferred based on the perception of acute pain infliction to 
body parts107 (i.e. perceiving needles pricking the hand). These regions also coincide with the results of an inde-
pendent meta-analysis on the effects of loving-kindness meditation on the brain108. Loving-kindness is a type of 
mediation that fosters compassion and deep genuine sympathy for those stricken by misfortune, together with 
an earnest wish to ease this suffering109. Of the regions revealing characteristic activation for the mild out-group, 
the right supramarginal gyrus (i.e. secondary somatosensory cortex) could be successfully linked with the mag-
nitude of the desirability bias. That empathy could be the mechanism underlying the desirability bias for the mild 
out-group receives further support from the demonstration of causal links between the supramarginal gyrus and 
empathic responses in studies of transcranial magnetic stimulation (primary somatosensory cortex110,111, the 
right supramarginal gyrus91,112,113, motor cortex92,114), and transcranial direct current stimulation (right supra-
marginal gyrus115–119 and motor cortex93).
We note that, although the current results suggest that the desirability bias towards the warm out-group may 
stem from empathic concern and compassion, future research should formally investigate this by manipulat-
ing the degree of compassion or empathy. Furthermore, one may ask why members of a warm but incompe-
tent out-group may trigger emotions of pity and sympathy60,66,70. Although out-groups are, generally, sources 
of threat and vigilance120, warm out-groups represent a special exception66,77–82. This out-group’s lack of compe-
tence puts them at a higher risk for undesirable outcomes yet they cannot be blamed for their fate on account of 
their warmth traits67,70. Consequently, respondents may overestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes and/or 
underestimate the likelihood of negative ones for warm out-groups to reduce the cognitive dissonance, perhaps 
as a result of just-world beliefs121,122.
In contrast, evaluating the two cold out-groups was associated with activity in a network of right-side brain 
regions, i.e. the TPJ, ATL, and the IFC. In our hypotheses, we had argued that respondents might rely on stere-
otypical thinking about these groups to inform their likelihood estimates41–44. Stereotypical thinking consists of 
several stages, including encoding and storing conceptual associations between a social group behavioural or 
mental attributes, accessing these associations from semantic memory and matching them to perceived social 
Region
Cluster 
size z-score
MNI 
coordinates
Pars orbitalis and anterior insula 388 5.15 −30, 18, −16
^ 4.45 −32, 22, 2
^ 4.25 −38, 18, −12
Dorsomedial frontal cortex 112 4.2 6, 52, 30
^ 3.76 6, 48, 38
^ 3.1 2, 54, 22
Dorsomedial frontal cortex 34 3.68 −6, 52, 26
Pars triangularis 25 3.63 46, 24, 22
Anterior temporal lobe 31 3.53 52, 8, −38
Pars triangularis (inferior frontal cortex) 28 3.49 58, 30, 16
^ 3.26 50, 32, 14
Table 3. Regions that are significantly more active when evaluating the extreme (cold-incompetent) out-group 
than the mild (warm-incompetent) out-group and the moderate (cold-competent) out-group, with the in-group 
as baseline. p < 0.001 and a cluster-level p < 0.01. ^part of the same functional cluster as above.
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group in a task-dependent manner44. Several authors argue that at the heart of this matching process is the 
self-other differentiation48, in which the right TPJ likely plays a crucial role, as shown by studies on transcranial 
magnetic stimulation123–129, direct current stimulation130 and multivariate pattern analysis131,132. Although it is 
still debated how the exact mechanism of self-other differentiation occurs133, it is a necessary mechanism in social 
cognition and it describes the ability to distinguish between representations of our own actions, perceptions and 
emotions, and those of others, and toggle between the two perspectives45–48. Although the right TPJ has a much 
broader role in visual attention and flexibly switching between interoceptive and exteroceptive perception134, 
one hypothesis is that evolution may have re-purposed voluntary attention and spatial orientation for social 
cognition135.
Bilateral ATL plays play a crucial role in encoding and storing both social and non-social conceptual knowl-
edge49,50, as shown by studies on lesion patients136–143, transcranial magnetic stimulation136,144–154, intracranial 
recordings155 and metabolic dysfunctions156,157. Our findings show that the behavioural scores of desirability 
bias for the businessperson and the alcoholic significantly correlate with the brain activity in the right ATL. 
Evaluating the alcoholic additionally recruited the anterior insula, the dmPFC and other patches in the ATL and 
IFC (pars triangularis). Because the anterior insula has been causally linked to the experience of disgust in studies 
of invasive158–160 and non-invasive161,162 brain stimulation, and the SCM predicts disgust to be a unique reaction 
to cold-incompetent out-groups62, it would be tempting to suggest that our findings provide support for the latter. 
Our findings concerning the network of empathic concern towards the elderly characters also seem to support 
the SCM prediction for the social emotions that respondents might experience62.
Surprisingly, of the regions uniquely active to the alcoholic character, it was the brain activity in the right 
pars triangularis that significantly correlated with the corresponding desirability bias for the alcoholic. The right 
pars triangularis has been involved in a wide range of perceptual decision-making tasks163–165, i.e. deliberating 
over what is perceived based on sensory information166. Computationally, perceptual decision-making consists 
of matching the incoming perceptual evidence to a mental template that can take the form of episodic memories 
or semantic knowledge of how an object or a person looks like and behaves167–169. More than taking on a passive 
role in the matching process, the right pars triangularis is directly involved in the resolution of stimulus conflict, 
i.e. deciding which characteristics of a complex stimulus are relevant for accurately perceiving it170. Considering 
our current results and the previous research on the IFC within the framework of the SCM, one possible explana-
tion for the pars triangularis’ involvement in the desirability bias for the extreme out-group rests on successfully 
resolving the conflict between the mental template of a negative stereotype for individuals characterized by low 
warmth and low competence and the incoming perceptual information (e.g. the character experiencing a desira-
ble situation). Conflict resolution may then be achieved by attributing lower likelihood estimates to the desirable 
situations and/or higher estimates to the undesirable situations.
We would like to note the limitations of our study. While our sample size of 45 participants adheres to the 
minimum recommendation provided by Yarkoni and Braver for brain-behavioural correlations171, it is still far 
from an ideal size to uncover moderate effect sizes172. We tried to mitigate this logistical aspect with robust 
skipped correlations173, in line with the most recent recommendations for best practices in brain-behavioural 
correlations174. In addition, we had strong a priori hypotheses about our brain regions, we considered network 
activation and we corrected for multiple comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg formula whenever there 
was more than one hypothesized region. Overall, we are confident that our brain-behavioural correlations are 
not spurious. The present literature would benefit from replicating our current findings with a larger sample size, 
which should provide increased power to detect brain-behaviour correlations in more regions of our networks of 
interest172. For example, activity in only one region in the network of interest for hypothesis H2 was significantly 
correlated with the desirability bias scores but this does not necessarily mean it is the only region with this feature. 
We also note that the visual analogue scale that participants used to rate the likelihood estimates always displayed 
the value “0%” in the left and “100%” in the right, while the slider always started at “50%”. While the fixed labels 
for the extremes of the scale is unlikely to have had any confounding effects on our data175, the starting position 
of the slider may have influenced the differential rating of the characters. Future studies can investigate whether a 
randomly positioned slider would maintain our current results.
A general limitation in neuroimaging studies is the use of reverse inferences100,101, in which researchers are 
limited in their confidence of associating cognitive functions to brain activation. While this limitation cannot 
be fully avoided, we tried to increase the degree of confidence in our brain-function associations with several 
steps. First, we based our hypotheses in previous literature of social cognition, by focusing on networks of 
regions instead of isolated structures, and we only discuss findings that supported our predictions. Second, we 
provide references from multiple methods to support our brain-function associations, such as meta-analyses, 
large scale databases, lesion studies, and invasive and non-invasive brain stimulation studies. Third, whenever 
cross-referencing brain-function associations with multiple methods was not possible, we emphasized the spec-
ulative nature of these associations.
Overall, the present study’s findings build on and extend our previous behavioural results74 and suggest 
that the SCM can only be applied to predict behavioural, emotional and neural responses to out-groups but 
not in-groups. In contrast to the former, responses to the in-group may be influenced by reference to personal 
experience rather than stereotypes of warmth and competence. Such an interpretation can also explain the dis-
agreement in predictions between SCM and the general social cognition literature concerning shared cognitive 
processes across dimensions (secondary goal of the current study). Although the in-group shares warmth traits 
with the warm out-group and competence traits with the cold-competent out-group at a conceptual level60, the 
neural responses do not back up these shared traits. Instead, in-group and out-group members are perceived 
and evaluated qualitatively different, above and beyond warmth and competence traits. However, warmth and 
competence traits may still hold considerable predictive power over the neural responses to out-groups. These 
findings could also spark interest in the field of social cognition and social neuroscience to move forward from 
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studying obvious out-groups (e.g. ethnic or racial out-groups) to investigating a wider range of out-groups, in 
line with SCM predictions. At a practical level, our results could help inform policy makers and health promoters 
about the underpinnings of social optimism bias. For example, our inherent optimistic expectancies for the future 
of in-group and warm out-group members can have detrimental effects on taking steps to prevent accidents and 
illnesses. Risk communicators aware of the cognitive processes underlying these expectancies can make it par-
ticularly salient in their message that a lack of experience with a particular hazard is not protective against future 
experiences or that idle compassion is not sufficient to prevent threats. Conversely, our pessimistic expectancies 
for the cold-incompetent out-group can have detrimental effects on social policies, by questioning their efficacy 
and stalling their implementation. Understanding the cognitive mechanisms behind these expectancies can help 
policy makers fine tune campaigns to reduce prejudice against cold-incompetent out-groups.
In summary, we show that a specific form of social optimism bias, i.e. desirability bias, correlates with the 
brain activity in those structures that respondents differentially engage when assessing members of different 
social groups. Evaluating the in-group recruited regions that have been previously associated with self-referential 
processing, whereas evaluating the warm out-group engaged regions that have been repeatedly linked with com-
passion and empathic concern. Thinking about cold out-groups triggered activation in regions of stereotypical 
thinking. Future studies on desirability bias could benefit from incorporating other neuroimaging methods, such 
as multivariate pattern analysis and functional connectivity analysis. In our results, only a few of the regions 
inside our hypothesized networks of interest were correlated with the desirability bias. While a larger sample 
size might have picked up additional correlations172, this might also suggest that the complex phenomenon of 
the desirability bias extends beyond the network of interest (e.g. compassion and empathic concern) to other 
networks that are recruited in a task-based manner176 and that perhaps it may not be captured by contrast-based 
fMRI analyses177. Future studies using functional connectivity with the seed regions in the structures that we have 
identified here may prove a further step of inquiry. In the only other neuroimaging study on social optimism bias, 
the magnitude of the bias correlated with the degree of differential functional connectivity between the dorsal 
striatum and regions of visual perception and attention18.
An interesting avenue for future research would further consist of an extension of the SCM to out-groups that 
possess high-warmth, high-competence traits in order to examine whether it is the quadrant of the model that 
lacks prognostic value or whether the restricted predictive power of the model is limited to the in-group, above 
and beyond warmth and competence traits. To our knowledge, no other SCM study has done so. Furthermore, 
potential respondents in future studies could include in-group members of a different SCM quadrant, such as a 
high-warmth, low-competence social group (e.g. the elderly67,178) and compare the pattern of results with our stu-
dent population. Finally, future research should incorporate ratings of warmth and competence, as well as other 
emotional descriptors (i.e. assessment of perceived level of threat) as moderators of the fMRI analysis. The SCM 
already incorporates emotional descriptions into its predictions62 but a formal investigation would be welcome.
Methods
participants. Forty-eight Swiss university students participated in this study. They were recruited via fliers 
and the local participant pool at the University of Bern. In exchange for their participation, they received either 
course credits or monetary payment (25 CHF per hour). As inclusion criteria, participants had to be German-
speaking full-time university students, aged between 18 and 40 years, right-handed, and have a Body Mass Index 
between 18.5 and 25. Self-reported neurological and psychiatric disorders, as well as MRI contraindications were 
exclusion criteria. Three participants were further excluded due to excessive movement or suspicious behavioural 
scores (i.e. the values “0%”, “50%” or “100%” represented more than three standard deviations above the per-
centages of estimates at the sample level). The analyses reported below are based on the final sample of forty-five 
participants (thirty-one females, M = 23.22, SD = 3.58). The communicated purpose of the study was gaining 
insight into the neural correlates of thinking about the future.
All participants gave informed and written consent for their participation. The local ethics committee of the 
University of Bern approved all experimental protocols and methods of data collection, data handling and anal-
ysis. All methods and experimental protocols were performed in accordance with the guidelines and regulations 
of the local Ethics Committee of the University of Bern, Switzerland.
paradigm. Data collection took place at the Insel University Hospital of Bern, Switzerland. Participants had 
to evaluate the likelihood estimates of four fictional characters experiencing an identical set of desirable and 
undesirable events, as described in Dricu et al.74. Sixteen desirable and sixteen undesirable events had been pre-
viously matched on valence (i.e. how far apart the event’s valence was from a hypothetical middle point, implying 
an emotionally neutral event), emotional impact, personal experience, perceived controllability, and frequency 
in the general population. The four characters reflected each of the quadrants of the two-dimensional space of 
warmth and competence60,65. A student character served as a high warmth, high competence in-group for our 
participants11,27,28,74,104. Three additional characters served as out-groups. An elderly person (high warmth, low 
competence67); served as a mild out-group. A successful businessperson (low warmth, high competence58,64,69); 
served as a moderate out-group. Finally, an alcoholic character served as an extreme out-group (low on both 
warmth and competence60).
The experiment was programmed with E-Prime 2.0 Professional (version 2.0.10.353; Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, USA). The task was approximately thirty minutes long and was split in four blocks of equal 
lengths. During each block, the thirty-two unique scenarios were paired with each of the four characters in a 
Latin Square Design and presented in a randomized order. At the beginning of the first block, written instructions 
were displayed on the computer screen, asking participants to familiarize themselves with the four characters 
and informing them of the task, i.e. provide likelihood estimates for each of the four characters experiencing 
certain events (Supplementary Fig. S5). Each trial started with a jittered fixation cross (1.5s–3s), followed by a 
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single screen which contained the target scenario (i.e. a single still animation of the target character involved in 
the target event), a one-sentence description of the target event displayed in the middle of the screen and a visual 
analogue scale from 0% to 100%. Participants had ten seconds to choose a likelihood score with the continuous 
visual analogue scale. The total experimental procedure lasted less than 35 min. A response box with two buttons 
was used to move a slider across the visual analogue scale. If no selection was made, the choice “50” (default 
choice on the scale) was automatically registered for that event.
Data acquisition and pre-processing. Behavioural analyses were performed in SPSS 25 (International 
Business Machines Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA). Participants used a visual analogue scale from 0% to 100% 
to determine the perceived likelihood estimate of a character experiencing a target event. Trials in which par-
ticipants did not move the slider (approximately 1% of all trials) were excluded from both the behavioural and 
neuroimaging analyses. The dependent variable was the difference in the z-standardized likelihood estimates 
between desirable and undesirable events, computed at the level of each participant, separately for each of the 
four fictional characters.
All MRI images were acquired using a 3 Tesla Siemens Magnetom Prisma Scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) with a 64-channel head coil at the Insel University Hospital in Bern, Switzerland. Volumes were reg-
istered using a T2*-weighted multi-band echo-planar imaging sequence (multi-band EPI) with 48 slices cov-
ering the whole brain (slice thickness = 2 mm; 0.5 mm gap; interleaved slice order; TR/TE = 1000 ms/30 ms; 
flip angle = 80°; field of view = 192 × 192 mm; matrix size = 96 × 96; voxel size = 2 × 2 × 2.5 mm; PAT mode 
GRAPPA; acceleration factor 2; multiband factor = 3). An anatomical scan (MP-RAGE; 1 mm isotropic voxels; 
TR = 2300 ms; TE = 2.98 ms; flip angle = 9°; matrix size = 256 × 256) was conducted before the functional run to 
get highly resolved structural information for the normalization procedure.
Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM12; Welcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in Matlab R2017b (Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, USA) was used 
for data analysis. Calculations were performed on UBELIX (https://ubelix.unibe.ch/docs), the high-performance 
computing cluster at the University of Bern. After slice time correction (middle slice acquisition was used as a ref-
erence slice), unwarping and spatial realignment (4th-degree b-Spline interpolation), retrospective noise correc-
tion was carried out using the Functional Image Artefact Correction Heuristic Package (FIACH179; implemented 
in R; R Development Core Team, 2008). Moreover, six principal components of physiological noise regressors 
were calculated with FIACH. Next, functional data were co-registered to each participant’s anatomical image, 
normalized to the standard space of the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) EPI template to permit group 
analyses, and spatially smoothed with an isotropic three-dimensional Gaussian filter with a full-width at half 
maximum (FWHM) of 6 mm.
For statistical analyses, event-related signal changes were modelled separately for each participant, using the 
general linear model (GLM) as implemented in SPM12, in which each trial was modelled with a boxcar func-
tion with a variable duration equal to the trial-by-trial deliberation time, i.e. from the start of the trial until the 
release of the buttons of the response box. For all fMRI analyses, nuisance regressors were included as follows: six 
movement parameters from the realignment procedure, six physiological noise parameters obtained during noise 
correction with FIACH. Additionally, a constant covariate representing the session-specific mean over scans was 
implemented in the first-level model. The models included a high-pass filter of 128 s to remove low-frequency 
drift of the scanner and first-order auto-regressive corrections for auto-correlation between scans.
A voxel height threshold of p < 0.001 was adopted for whole-brain analyses, with correction for multiple com-
parisons performed at the cluster level (p < 0.01), as first described by Slotnick et al.180. The cluster extent thresh-
old procedure relies on the fact that, given spurious activity or noise (voxel-wise type I error), the probability of 
observing increasingly large (spatially contiguous) clusters of activity systematically decreases181. Thus, a cluster 
extent threshold can be enforced to ensure an acceptable probability of cluster-wise type I error. This approach is 
more sensitive to small effects than the standard 0.05 familywise error correction, while still being an adequate 
correction for multiple comparisons181–183. Our cluster extent threshold was obtained by simulating whole-brain 
fMRI activation using custom software written in Matlab180,184. The script modelled our entire functional image 
matrix 94 × 94 × 48 (i.e. acquisition matrix by slice), assumed a type I error voxel activation probability of 0.001, 
and smoothed the activation map by convolution with a 3-dimensional 6 FWHM Gaussian kernel. After 10,000 
Monte Carlo independent iterations, the probability of each cluster size was determined and the cluster extent 
that yielded P < 0.01 was selected for use in voxel extent thresholding, i.e. 30 contiguous resampled voxels (23 
original voxels) or a volume of 240 mm3. Each contrast that entered a null conjunction analysis was also thresh-
olded at p < 0.001, with the same cluster extent of 30 voxels as described above.
Data analysis. To determine how the desirability bias manifests in the brain, we performed a series of 
brain-behaviour correlation analyses between the SCM group-specific desirability biases, on one hand, and the 
parameter estimates related to activity within each of the respective set of regions hypothesized (H1, H2, H3 
and H4). Specifically, based on our hypotheses, we first determined significant group differences at the brain 
level. To this aim, we calculated several hypothesis-driven contrasts in the BOLD signal (see Results section for 
details). We then calculated the mean values of the parameter estimates in a 6 mm cube around the peak voxels 
determined in the hypothesis-driven contrasts of all trials pertaining to a specific SCM character, irrespective of 
the valence of the trial (desirable or undesirable). At the behavioural level, we determined desirability bias scores 
by calculating the difference [estimated likelihood for desirable events – estimated likelihood for undesirable 
events] for each SCM character in each participant. Finally, we opted for brain-behaviour correlations between 
these desirability bias scores for each SCM social group, on one hand, and the BOLD signal change in relevant 
brain regions, on the other hand. For the latter, we calculated the mean values of the parameter estimates in a 
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6 mm cube around the peak voxels found significant at the group-level in the unmodulated analysis of all trials 
pertaining to a specific social target group, irrespective of the valence of the trial (desirable or undesirable).
We chose the more robust and powerful “skipped” correlations as suggested by Rousselet and Pernet174, and 
implemented in the Robust Correlation Matlab Toolbox (https://sourceforge.net/projects/robustcorrtool)173. 
Skipped correlations are robust measures of association between variables that provide effect sizes and confidence 
intervals subsequent to removing outliers. For comparison, we also report traditional Spearman correlation esti-
mates with all potential outliers included, as suggested elsewhere174. In those brain-behaviour correlation analyses 
that comprised the examination of multiple regions, we used the Benjamini-Hochberg step-up procedure to 
correct for multiple testing (false discovery rate alpha = 0.05, two-tailed185). The three sets of brain-behaviour cor-
relations (H1, H2, H3 and H4) were treated as independent from each other for the purposes of this correction.
Data availability
Under the Swiss guidelines of data protection (Ordinance HFV Art. 5), the datasets generated and analysed 
during the current study can be made available from the corresponding author on a case by case basis.
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